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I.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The singular issue presented in this appeal is whether the
Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law when it held that
plaintiff
separate

cannot

combine

industrial

the

permanent

impairment

resulting from

injuries with the same employer

in order to

reach the 10% threshold necessary under the Statute for compensation
of pre-existing conditions neither caused nor aggravated by any of
the industrial injuries.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE C^SE

The industrial injuries involved

in this case consist of

two separate identifiable back injuries sustained by applicant while
working for defendant Provo Canyon School (hereinafter called Canyon
School).
1984

The first

while

Canyon

identifiable

injury occurred

School

insured

was

by

on December 23,

defendant

Worker's

Compensation Fund of Utah although the record shows that plaintiff
previous to that time had back problems from time to time resulting
either from prior industrial events or plaintiff's congenital back

problems.

The

sustained

second

in attempting

at Canyon School.
time

industrial

the

injury

also

was

a

back

to physically restrain one of the students

This injury occurred on January lf 1986.

compensation

injury

carrier

for

Canyon

Insurance Company of North America/Atena.

School

was

At this
defendant

It should be noted

that

the compensation carrier in each of the separate industrial injuries
accepted

liability

temporary
those

total

for

the

industrial

compensation

particular

and

industrial

injury

medical

injuries.

involved

expenses
The

and

paid

associated

with

record

shows

that

plaintiff has had four surgeries on his back since 1982 and that he
had

considerable

difficulty

with

back

problems

even prior

to his

employment by Canyon School.
Plaintiff
of

the

above

filed separate applications for hearing for each

described

industrial

injuries

in

which

he

claimed

additional temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits
in addition

to additional

medical

benefits.

The

two

applications

for hearing were consolidated and set for hearing on June 12, 1986.
The medical aspects of the case were referred to a special Medical
Panel

for

1986,

finding

from

all

review and

the Medical

that plaintiff's

causes was

Panel Report was

total physical

filed July 16,

impairment

50% loss of body function.

Included

resulting
was 20%

loss of body function attributable to plaintiff's back problems of
which
the

5% whole
December

impairment

man permanent
23,

resulting

1984
from

partial

industrial
the

impairment
injury,

January

1,

was attributed

with

1986

no

injury.

percent of plaintiff's back impairment was attributable to

2

to

permanent
Fifteen

pre-existing

conditions

aggravated

by

the

additional

impairments

of the back which were found

December
of

arms as being congenital
industrial

injury.

previously

been

23,

14% and

injury.

The

12% attributable

and neither

Plaintiff's
rated

1984

caused

Panel

to

as

found

plaintiff's

nor aggravated

leg impairments

and - compensated

to have been

by any

of 15% and

3% had

permanent

partial

disabilities for prior industrial injuries.
The
Report
for

Administrative

and awarded

his

5% back

Law

plaintiff

condition

Judge

adopted

permanent

found

the

Medical

partial disability

attributable

Panel

benefits

to the December

23,

1984 incident (to be paid by defendant Worker's Compensation Fund of
Utah) and a 15% pre-existing aggravated

permanent

paid

No award was made for the

by defendant

Second

Injury Fund.

impairment

to be

pre-exisiting unaggravated impairment to plaintiff's arms nor to the
pre-exisiting
already

had

unaggravated
been

disabilities.

impairment

compensated

As

for

indicated

as

before

to

plaintiff's

industrial
no

legs

permanent

permanent

which
partial

impairment

was

awarded for the January 1, 1986 accident.
On or about November
Review
December

which
23.

was

denied

1986.

This

by

7, 1986 plaintiff filed a Motion for
the

full

Action was

Industrial

filed

by

Commission

plaintiff

with

on
the

Court of Appeals on January 20, 1987.
III.

The
dispute

or

critical
so

well

facts

STATEMENT OF FACTS

in this controversy are either

established

reasonable controversy.

by

the

record

They are as follows:
3

as

to

be

not in
beyond

1.
past

Plaintiff has sustained multiple injuries over the

eight

to

ten

years

and

has

been

treated

different doctors for many different conditions.
has

included

hand

surgery,

treatment

of

broken shoulder, knee

injuries, a head

others.

injuries

The

knee

both

by

many

Treatment
ankles,

a

injury and perhaps

resulted

from

separate

industrial accidents and compensation was paid to plaintiff
for those injuries.
2.

In

pre-existing

addition
conditions

to

the

above,

resulting

plaintiff

in permanent

had

impairments

in the form of birth defects of both arms which ultimately
were rated

by the Medical Panel as 14% for the right arm

and 12% for the left arm.

Evidence showed-and the Medical

Panel found-that neither of the arm impairments was related
to or aggravated by any of the industrial injuries involved
herein.
3.

Plaintiff's medical records show a long history of

back problems

including

any

of any

recording

first

identifiable

three

low back surgeries prior to

industrial

back

injury

back
of

any

injury.

kind while

for Canyon School was the injury of December
which he reported

he twisted

Plaintiff's
working

23, 1984, in

his back while attempting to

restrain one of the Canyon School students who had become
aggressive in an altercation at the school.
Panel Report,

the Chairman noted

4

In his Medical

(P.5) that plaintiff had

not consulted
to

this

treated

his treating orthopedic surgeon with respect

alleged
him

for

back

injury

knee

problems

even

though

shortly

that

after

doctor

the

had

December

23, 1984 incident.
4.

Plaintiff's second alleged back injury occurred on

January

1, 1986,

in which

he reported,

"while

restraining a student my back was injured."

physically

Here again the

panel chairman pointed out that the medical records failed
to

show

respect

any

treatment

to

or

emphasis

by

plaintiff

with

to any back injury on that date even though there

was a reference in plaintiff's treating physician's records
as to a December 26, 1985 report of "patient slipped on the
ice

at

home

and

fell

twisting

his

back."

Nevertheless,

plaintiff asserted a re-injury to his back on that date and
subsequently filed an Application for Hearing with respect
to the same.
5.

As indicated

previously, plaintiff

filed

separate

applications for hearing with respect to each of the above
claimed

industrial back injuries.

consolidated

for

numerous medical

administrative
issues

could

Medical Panel for evaluation.

Those applications were
purposes

be submitted

so

that

directly

the
to a

The hearing was held on June

12, 1986 and at the conclusion of the hearing the medical
questions
Panel
Medical

and

issues were

appointed
Panel

Administrative

by

the

to a special Medical

Administrative

Report,
Law

submitted

which

Judge,
5

^as

assessed

Law

Judge.

adopted
a

permanent

by

The
the

partial

impairment of 5% whole man to plaintiff's industrial injury
of December

23, 1984 and found an additional

low back permanent partial of 15%.
not

find

claimed

any

permanent

back

reporting

only

disability

of

The Panel, however, did

impairment

injury

of

plaintiff

that

that

episode

approximately

pre-existing

attributable
on

January

gave

four

to

to

the

1,

1986,

a temporary

total

six

weeks

but

no

permanent impairment.
6.
that

In addition to the above, the Medical Panel found

plaintiff

problems

had

with

ring finger

his

a

right

shoulder

found

Panel

causes

the

shoulder,

by

and

to

pre-existing

aggravated

impairment

and a 12% impairment

with his left
by

14%

nor

right

elbow

attributable

and

to

right

to problems

left elbow both of which were

be

the

attributable

attributable

industrial

related

to

to

non-industrial

accident

either

of

and

the

neither

industrial

accidents involved herein.
7.

Based

Administrative
partial

of

Judge

award

benefits

35-1-39

Fund

U.C.A.

was

disability

which was aggravated
23,

Medical

from
of

the

1984.

No

his

an

Utah)

at

of
6

the

permanent
carrier

time

of the

effective March 29,

additional

pre-existing

permanent

5%

the

Under the provisions

by the industrial

award

Report,

employer's

as amended

awarded
for

Panel

plaintiff

23, 1984 industrial injury.

plaintiff

partial

the

Compensation

Section

1984,

Law

disability

(Worker's
December

upon

14%

back

permanent
impairment

injury of December
partial

disability

benefits was made to plaintiff for the industrial injury of
January

1, 1986

in view of the finding by the Panel that

there was no permanent
that

incident.

partial

Moreover,

impairment

attributable to

there was no award made by the

Administrative Law Judge to plaintiff for his pre-exisiting
impairment

to

his

right

lower upper extremity
to

non-industrial

accidents

and

neither

extremity

(14%) or

to the

(12%) because they were attributable

causes

accidents, holding
plaintiff's

upper

pre-exisiting

related

to nor

the

industrial

aggravated

by those

the same to be non-compensable

industrially

caused

5%

impairment

because

of

the low

back did not meet the 10% threshold minimum requirement set
forth in Section 35-1-69.
8.

On November 10f 1986 plaintiff filed a Motion for

Review asserting
have

awarded

non-aggravated
above.
issued

that the Administrative
permanent

upper

impairment

extremity

Law Judge should

benefits

impairments

as

for
set

the
forth

On December 23, 1986 the full Industrial Commission
Order

Findings

and

Denying Motion
Order

of

for Review and

the Administrative

affirming

Law Judge,

the
thus

giving rise to the present action filed with the Court of
Appeals.
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It is the basic position of the Second Injury Fund in this
case

that

allocation

the

Commission

provisions

of

did

not

Section

err

in

35-1-69

its

application

U.C.A.

to

of

the

plaintiff's

industrial

injuries

respectively

and

of

in

December

its

23,

holding

1984

that

and

January

neither

of

lf

1986

plaintiff's

industrial injuries met the threshold requirement of 10% in order to
entitle

plaintiff

to

compensation

upper extremity impairments.
the

Statutory

provision

for

his

pre-exisiting

unrelated

In addition to the plain language of

relating

to

compensability

of

unrelated

pre-existing conditions and threshold requirements which must be met
in

any

given

industrial

compensation,

the

Second

injury

in

Injury

Fund

order

to

refers

qualify

to

and

for

such

relies

upon

recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Second Injury Fund v.
Streator
to

as

Chevrolet

"Streator")

709 P.2d
and

the

1176
1987

(Utah, 1985) (hereafter
case

of Richfield

Care

referred
Center

v.

Torqerson 52 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (02/12/87) (hereafter referred to as
"Torqerson").

In

summarized

history

'35-1-69

the

with

the

Streator
of

particular

case

the

the

Combined

reference

to

the

Utah

Injury

Supreme
Statute

differences

Court
Section

between

the

language added by the 1981 amendment and the prior Statute and then
set

forth

compensation
other

hand

compensation

its

interpretation

in cases
the

".

where

.

of

of

aggravation

.second

there

the

is

no

and

requirements
on

the

entirely

aggravation."

necessary

one hand

and

independent
The

Court

for

on the

test
made

for
it

clear that ". . .no combination of impairments shall be deemed to be
"substantially greater" than the industrial injury impairment

alone

unless the industrial injury impairment is 10% or more and the total
impairment from all combined causes is 20% or more."

Throughout the

Court's opinion in that case, as well as throughout the language of
35-1-69, the emphasis is upon the industrial injury not industrial
8

injuries

even

combination

though

of

the

several

pre-existing

related

and/or

impairments

unrelated

may

injuries

be

a

or other

conditions.
In Torqerson the Court made it emphatically clear that "the
Commission

must

consider

separate

accidents

serially

in order

to

determine the percentage of impairment attributable to each accident
and

the proportion

combined

the pre-existing

impairment.••

impairment

bears to the total

Thus it is clear that the compensability as

well as the allocation requirements of Section 35-1-69 following its
1981

amendments

separately.

clearly

require

that

each

accident

be

considered

In this case the Commission did just that in its award

of benefits to plaintiff

for the pre-exisiting condition which was

aggravated by the industrial injury of December 23f 1984 and in its
denial of compensability
the industrial
the

Statute

for unrelated pre-existing

impairment when

injury failed to meet the threshold

requirements of

for

compensability

of

the

unrelated

pre-exisiting

conditions.
In view of the above, it is apparent

that the Commission

did not err as a matter of law in its determination that plaintiff
was

not

entitled

to

compensation

for

his

pre-existing

unrelated

upper extremity impairments in connection witti either his industrial
injury of December 23, 1984 or that of January 1, 1986 because the
impairment from his industrial injury in each case did not meet the
threshold

requirements

of the Statute

it is the position of the Second
interpretation

of the threshold

for compensability.

Indeed,

Injury Fund that the Commission's
requirements of Section 35-1-69 as

applied to the circumstances of this controversy was wholly
9

consistent with

the plain

language of the Statute and with the

interpretation given by the Utah Supreme Court in both the Streator
and the Torqerson decisions pertaining to that Section.
V.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
ITS DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT SATISFY THE THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN THE STATUTE.
Plaintiff contends that somehow the threshold requirements
of Section 35-1-69 should be construed to permit the accumulation of
two, three or more separate industrial injury impairments in order
to satisfy the threshold value set by the Statute as necessary in
order

to

obtain

impairments.
language

compensation

for

unrelated

pre-exisiting

The Second Injury Fund submits that neither the plain

of

the

Statute,

the

history

behind

the

threshold

requirements inserted by the legislature in the 1981 amendments nor
the interpretations of those amendments by the Utah Supreme Court
reasonably

permit

or

even

suggest

the

results

contended

by

plaintiff.

Plaintiff makes no contention that his upper extremity

permanent impairments were aggravated by or in any way related to
either the industrial injury of December 23, 1984 or that of January
1,

1986.

Nor

Commission was

does

he

in error

contend

that

the

in not awarding

Medical
at least

Panel

or

the

10% permanent

partial impairment for either of the industrial injuries mentioned.
Plaintiff

does

contend,

however,

that

somehow

the

threshold

requirements of the Statute permit him to accumulate or pyramid all
of his industrial injuries until such time as the 10% threshold is
reached

and

then

he

can

bring
10

in

all

pre-existing

unrelated

permanent impairments for compensation from the Second
The

express

industrial
after

language
injuries.

the

simplest

1981

simply

does

not

A detailed

legislative

permit

Injury Fund.

such a pyramiding

of

review of the Statute before and

amendments

is

not

necessary.

The

and most authoritative approach is found in the opinion by

Justice Zimmermann in the Streator Chevrolet case a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit A.
At 709 P.2d page 1180, Justice Zimmermann has set forth the
pertinent

provisions

material

added

amendment.

of

and

Having

the

lined

first

Statute
out

with

material

reviewed

notations

of

deleted

by

the series

underlined
the

of cases

1981

immediately

preceding the 1981 legislative amendments to Section 35-1-69 such as
Intermountain
(1977),

White

Heath Care
v.

Inc. v. Ortega, Utah,

Industrial

Commission,

Ut$h,

562 P.2d

617, 619

604

478,

P.2d

480

(1979) and Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. dapitano, Utah 610 P.2d
334 at 337 (1980), Justice Zimmermann then pointed out that the 1981
legislative amendments

to that Section were the apparent

result of

the Court's suggestion that the Commission address its concerns to
the Legislature rather than by refusing to follow the decisions as
set forth by the Court.
Justice Zimmermann then reviewed in detail the requirements
under

the

1981

legislative

amendments,

first

with

respect

aggravation:
If the
industrial
injury
results
in a
permanent impairment that is aggravated by or
aggravates a pre-existing permanent impairment to.
any degree, then compensation shall be awarded
and allocated between the employer and the Second
Injury Fund based upon the combined impairment,
(emphasis supplied)
11

to

The Court

interpreted

that Section

to apply only to pre-existing

conditions or injuries which aggravated or were in turn aggravated
by the industrial injury. (Please note that the Court refers even
here

to

the

singular

"the

industrial

injury").

The

Court

specifically rejected the contention that aggravation of one injury
can

trigger

compensation

for

unrelated

pre-existing

impairments.

709 P.2d at 1181.
The
construed

Court,

through

Justice

Zimmermann's

opinion,

then

the threshold requirements necessary for compensation of

unrelated pre-existing impairments.

The Court makes it clear that

under the threshold amendment, in order for pre-existing unrelated
impairments

(plural)

to

be

compensated,

the

industrial

injury

(singular) must produce a permanent impairment of 10% or more.
addition the total impairment
industrial

and

from all combined

the pre-existing,

must

In

causes, including

be greater

than 20%.

The

Court in the Streator case further refined the requirement of 10%
permanent

impairment

from the industrial injury as being a "whole

man" requirement rather than a combined requirement as frequently is
used in combining impairments of various nature.
The interpretation set forth above in the Streator case is
still the law with respect to the determination of compensability
for

pre-existing

injury

which

conditions.

injuries

aggravates

and
or

conditions

is

when

aggravated

by

combined
those

with

an

pre-existing

It is still the law also where the injury is unrelated

to the pre-existing impaired conditions, in which case, as here, the
threshold

requirement

must

be

satisfied

in

order

compensation to be awarded for the unrelated pre-existing
12

for

any

impairments.
industrial
man

As mentioned

above,

injury must result

basis

of

10%

or

those

requirements

are

that

the

in a permanent; impairment on a whole

more

and

the

combined

industrial

and

pre-existing impairments must be greater than 20%.
It should

be noted

that the only dissent

in the Streator

case was that of Chief Justice Hall who reasserted his opinion that
there should be required in every instance some relationship between
the

industrial

impairments

injury

on

the

on the other.

As

one

hand

indicated,

and

the

pre-existing

above the Court

majority

held otherwise, saying that the Statute prior to its 1981 amendments
did not require any such relationship between the industrial injury
on

the one hand

and

the pre-existing

impairments

on the other in

order for the latter to be compensable.
The
Court

in

accidents

recent

(February,

the Torqerson
must

be

case,

considered

percentage

of

proportion

the pre-existing

impairment.
had

impairment

by

an

2 1/2% permanent
impairment

of

supra,

doubt

left

no

serially

in

order

attributable

to

each

impairment

the Utah

to

that

Supreme
separate

determine

accident

and

the
the

bears to the total combined

In that case the Medical Panel found that the applicant

a pre-existing

aggravated

1987) decision

permanent
injury

partial

in

back
1980

impairment
to

the

of

extent

2 1/2% which was
of

an

additional

impairment, with another 2 1/2% permanent

attributable to a final injury in 1982.

The Commission

considered the two industrial units together rather than separately
and

apportioned

permanent

partial

disability

and

temporary

total

disability benefits on the same ratio: 1/3 to the Second Injury Fund
for the pre-existing 2 1/2% permanent partial impairment and 2/3 to
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the employer for the industrial injuries of 1980 and 1982 each of
which resulted in 2 1/2% permanent partial impairment.

The carrier

for the employer acknowledged that the permanent partial disability
compensation
(Second

should

Injury

Insurance

Fund),

Fund)

Insurance Fund).
temporary
each

total

injury

be charged

and

1/3
1/3

1/3

to
to

to the pre-existing

the
the

1980
1982

condition

industrial

injury

(State

industrial

injury

(State

However, it contended that in the apportionment of
disability

separately.

benefits

the Commission

In so doing

must

the allocation

consider

between the

employer on the one hand and the Second Injury Fund for the 1980
injury would

be 50% since the pre-existing condition contributed

1/2 and the 1980 industrial 1/2 of the permanent impairment.
the

1982

injury,

the

proportion

of

pre-existing

As to

impairment

then

became 5% and the industrial injury impairment for that 1982 injury
remained at 2 1/2%.
temporary

total

Therefore, the apportionment of liability for

compensation

benefits

resulting

from

the

1982

industrial injury became 2/3 to the Second Injury Fund and 1/3 to
the employer.

(52 UT Adv. Rep. at 24)

The Torqerson decision was

unanimous and clearly stands as the authority for the requirement of
the Court
serially

that
in

"the Commission

order

to

must

determine

consider

the

separate

percentage

of

accidents
impairment

attributable to each accident and the proportion the pre-existing
impairment bears to the total combined impairment."
In summary, it is the position of the Second Injury Fund
that under the plain language of the Statute as to the threshold
requirements

for

compensability

of

unrelated

pre-existing

impairments, combined with the rationale of the Torqerson case as
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set

forth

above

and

the

clear

Streator case, the Commission

cut

requirements

set

forth

in the

in this controversy did not err when

it denied plaintiff the right to pyramid impairments from successive
industrial injuries in order to reach the threshold value necessary
for
for

the

industrial

his

injury

pre-existing

Commission

properly

injury

the

and

reached

the

considered
1.

entitle

15% pre-existing

industrial

injury

23,

1984

injury

plaintiff

impairment

compensation

impairments.

December

industrial

that

of December

plaintiff

permanent

the

1986

conclusion

additional

injury resulted

thus

unrelated

January

proper

and

was

The

industrial

separately

and

entitled

to the

which was aggravated

by the

23, 1984 even though the

in only a 5% permanent

industrial

and partial impairment but

that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his pre-existing
unrelated

impairments because neither the industrial injury of 1984

nor

that

of

1986

plaintiff

of

the

resulted

in

10% necessary

a

permanent

to meet

partial

impairment

the threshold

to

requirement.

The Commission's decision below, therefore, must be affirmed.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's medical records show a long history of medical
problems
injuries,
injuries

and

ailments

industrial
of

1984

and

of

various

and

kinds

otherwise,

1986

while

as

prior

working

well
to

for

as

his
Canyon

a

number

alleged

of
back

School.

On

December 23, 1984 and January 1, 1986 claimant alleged separate back
injuries while attempting
Canyon School.

to restrain recalcitrant

students at the

The medical records with respect to those particular

incidents were somewhat sketchy at best, but plaintiff nevertheless
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insisted
dates

that he had

and

a

incurred

separate

application

Commission with respect
were consolidated
appropriate

separate

to each.

was

back
filed

Panel

with

the

Law Judge

ailments,

consideration

pre-exisiting

of

conditions,

injuries, industrial and otherwise.
was

adopted

by

permanent

partial

23,

and

1984

no

the

those

permanent

to the

Law

Judge

industrial

impairment

incident of January 1, 1986.

birth

for Hearing

alleged

injuries

to plaintiff's

defects

and

prior

The Medical Panel Report which

Administrative

impairment

Industrial

in order to get

along with the extensive medical records pertaining
other

on those two

The two Applications

by the Administrative

Medical

injuries

attributed
injury

as a result

of

of

a

5%

December

the

alleged

The Panel further found that plaintiff

had a 15% permanent impairment of his back which was aggravated by
the back injury of December 23, 1984.
industrial
with

The Panel reported additional

impairments which had previously

impairments

pre-existing

to

birth

plaintiff's
defects

and

upper
were

been compensated
extremities

neither

which

related

to

along
were
nor

aggravated by either of the industrial accidents.
The Administrative Law Judge considered the industrial back
injuries

separately

and

awarded

plaintiff

5%

permanent

disability as a result of his industrial injury December
This award was considered

industrial

partial
23, 1984.

in nature and was assessed to

the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah, the compensation carrier for
Canyon School at the time.

In addition plaintiff was awarded from

the Second Injury Fund 15% permanent partial disability benefits due
to his pre-existing back impairment which was found to be aggravated
by the December 23, 1984 industrial injury.
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The Administrative Law

Judge then applied the threshold requirements of Section 35-1-69 and
found

that

plaintiff

pre-existing

was

unrelated

plaintiff's

total

not

entitled

upper

impairment

to

compensation

extremity

from

his

for

impairments

industrial

his

because

injury

was

less

than the 10% threshold requirement set forth in the 1981 legislative
amendments to Section 35-1-69 as a prerequisite for entitlement for
payment for pre-existing unrelated permanent
has

contended

pyramid
order

that

he

his permanent

to

payment

reach
for

Commission
position

the

his

the

compensation

plaintiff's
Second

does

cases
not

industrial

and

the clear

the

Streator

Commission's

level

Fund

industrial

and

unrelated

the

thus

Statute

injuries in

entitles

impairments.

for
that

Review
the

to

him to

The

and

it

Commission's

full

is

the

action

As indicated above, the plain language of the

impairments from prior
threshold

from prior

Motion

Injury

under

Plaintiff

to the Statute setting up the threshold values for
in

impairments

impairment

permitted

10% threshold

should be affirmed.
1981 amendments

be

pre-existing

denied

of

should

impairments.

of

permit

Order

or

even

10% requirement.

leaves
in

a

permanent

pyramiding

of

order to fulfill the

The history

of

the

Statute

set out by the Utah Supreme Court in

no

this

unrelated

suggest

injuries ih

industrial

interpretation
case

pre-existing

doubt

case.

as

to

the

propriety

Moreover/! the

recent

of

the

Torqerson

decision makes it clear that each industrial injury must be treated
separately
benefits.
construed

in

the

determination

and

allocation

of

disability

While plaintiff has contended that the Statute should be
liberally

in order

to achieve

justice and equity to the

plaintiff, its express provisions properly should not and cannot, in
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our opinion, be tortured to achieve a result that was never intended
by the terms of the Statute or any reasonable interpretation of the
same.

Accordingly,

submits

that

dismissed

and

the

plaintiff's
that

the

defendant
claim

Second

for

decision

of

Injury

additional
the

Fund

respectfully

benefits

Commission

in

should
this

should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this

13th

day of May, 1987.

^tie V. Boorfman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
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ly or unreasonably, or in excess of its
authority.10
(Emphasis added.)
Each of the foregoing cases stands for
the proposition that an award of compensation for preexisting incapacities is only to
be made to the extent the said incapacities
combine with and enhance the incapacity
which results from the industrial injury. I
have found no cases to the contrary. If
the law should be different, the subject
should be addressed by the legislature,
whose function and prerogative it is to
make changes or clarifications in the law.11
In the instant case, the record contains
substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached by the Commission that the
industrial injury was trivial in nature and
not enhanced or made substantially greater
than it would have been in the absence of
preexisting incapacities. Furthermore, the
facts do not in any way indicate that any of
the worker's problems subsequent to the
industrial injury, including his present severe arthritis in his hands, are in any way a
consequence of his industrial injury.
I would affirm the order of the Commission.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.

: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

S>

SECOND INJURY FUND, Plaintiff,
v.
STREATOR CHEVROLET and/or Utah
State Insurance Fund, Howard E. Webb
and the Industrial Commission of Utah,
Defendants.
No. 19595.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 18, 1985.
Industrial Commission awarded claimant compensation for permanent partial incapacity resulting from injuries to his back
sustained as a result of on-the-job accident
in 1982 and awarded him compensation for
preexisting permanent partial incapacities,"
and ordered Second Injury Fund to pay
that portion of the award attributable to
the preexisting impairments. Second Injury Fund challenged award by writ of review. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman/J.,
held that: (1) aggravation of claimant's"
preexisting back impairment did not re-J
quire compensation for all claimant's preexr;.
isting impairments regardless of their relationship to industrial injury and regardless:
of their severity, and (2) claimant who had
ten percent whole-man impairment from iig
dustrial injury, satisfied nonaggravation,
test governing circumstances under WHICH,
injured worker is entitled to recover DOI:
only for permanent partial incapacity^
caused by industrial injury, but also for?
permanent partial incapacities incurredj>rtj|
or to industrial injury, and was p r o p y l
entitled to compensation for all p r e e x i s t s
impairments.
Affirmed.
Hall, C.J., dissented and filed an QS»®
ion.
II, Workers' Compensation < ^ 1 0 3 0 ^
If industrial injury results in P ^ S |
kient impairment that is aggravatedjfiflfl

10.

526 P.2d at 1189 (footnote omitted).

11. Intermountain
337.

Smelting Corp., 6 1 0 - P * P "
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aggravates preexisting permanent impairment to any degree, then compensation
shall be awarded and allocated between
employer and Second Injury Fund based
lpon combined impairments. U.C.A., 1953,
55-1-69.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Gilbert
A. Martinez, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
James R. Black, Dennis V. Lloyd, Stuart
L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

I Workers' Compensation <s=1030.1(2)
Aggravation of claimant's preexisting
)ack impairment did not require compensa;ion for all claimant's preexisting impairments, including hand and eye impairments, regardless of their relationship to
ndustrial injury and regardless of their
severity. U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-69(1), (l)(a).
J. Workers' Compensation <£=*862
Threshold figures of ten and twenty
3ercent with respect to combined injuries
•esulting in permanent incapacity, in 1981
intendments to U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-69(1),
governing circumstances under which injured worker is entitled to recover not only
for permanent partial incapacity caused by
ndustrial injury, but also for permanent
partial incapacities incurred prior to industrial injury, are whole-man impairment ratings.
4. Workers' Compensation <3=>1030.1(3)
Claimant who had ten percent wholeman impairment from industrial injury, satisfied nonaggravation test of U.C.A., 1953,
35-1-69, governing circumstances under
which injured worker is entitled to recover
not only for permanent partial incapacity
caused by industrial injury, but also for
permanent partial incapacities incurred pri0r
to industrial injury, and was properly
entitled to compensation for all preexisting
impairments.
*• Workers' Compensation <^1030.1(2)
In nonaggravation case, no functional
f^tionship between current injury and
r^xisting impairment is necessary to
**ird
compensation; only issue under
%fcJk s t a t u t e m nonaggravation case is
^ . QT minimum percentages have been
fied a n d t h u s « s u b s t a n t i a l l y g r e a t e r »
T lr * * * been met. U.C.A, 1953, 35-1-69,
^ ~*Hl)(b).

This case raises for the first time the
proper interpretation of the 1981 amendments to section 35-1-69(1) of the Code
relating to the circumstances under which
an injured worker is entitled to recover not
only for permanent partial incapacity
caused by an industrial injury, but also for
permanent partial incapacities incurred prior to the industrial injury. The Industrial
Commission awarded claimant Webb compensation for permanent partial incapacity
resulting from injuries to his back sustained as a result of an on-the-job accident
in 1982. It also awarded him compensation
for preexisting permanent partial incapacities attributable to (1) an earlier injury to
his back, which was aggravated by the
1982 fall and injury, and (2) unrelated congenital or degenerative problems with his
hands and eyes. The Second Injury Fund
was ordered to pay that portion of the
award attributable to the preexisting impairments and challenges that award by
writ of review. We hold that the award
made by the Industrial Commission was
correct and affirm, albeit on slightly different grounds.
In April of 1982, claimant Webb slipped
and fell on some stairs at his place of
employment, Streator Chevrolet in Salt
Lake City. He injured his left elbow and
his lower back. At the time of this accident, Webb had three preexisting impairments: a lower back injury sustained in
Arizona in 1964 while working for another
employer (for which no compensation
award was ever paid); a condition of the
hands known as Dupuytren's Contractures,
which causes curling of the fingers; and
impaired vision in both eyes. The hand and
eye conditions were unrelated to any industrial accident or injury. Following the 1982
accident, Webb's back condition worsened
and surgery was required to remove dam-
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aged discs. He then filed a claim for compensation with the Commission.
A medical panel reviewed his case. It
reported no permanent impairment as a
result of the injury to the left elbow. However, it did find that Webb had a 10 percent
whole-man permanent partial impairment
by reason of the back injury suffered as a
result of the 1982 fall; an additional 15
percent whole-man permanent partial impairment from his prior low back injury,
which was aggravated by the fall; an 11
percent whole-man permanent partial impairment due to the hand problem; and a
20 percent whole-man permanent partial
impairment due to vision problems. Using
the analysis set forth in Jacobsen Construction v. Hair, Utah, 667 P.2d 25, 27-28
(1983), the medical panel found that the
preexisting conditions combined to produce
a rating of 39 percent permanent partial
impairment.
The administrative law judge adopted the
panel's findings as his own. He concluded
that under the Hair rationale the rating of
the 10 percent whole-man impairment resulting from the industrial injury must be
adjusted on a partial-man basis to account
for the preexisting impairments. Since
claimant was 61 percent unimpaired before
the accident (100% - 39% = 61%), the 10
percent whole-man impairment caused by
the accident added 6.1 percent to his disability (10% x 61% = 6.1%), giving a rounded final permanent partial disability figure
of 45 percent (39% + 6% = 45%). The defendants—the employer and/or its insurer,
the State Insurance Fund—were found entitled to reimbursement from the Second
Injury Fund for 3%5, or 87 percent, of future medical payments to the claimant.
The defendants also were held liable for a 6
percent award, or $3,201.12, of the total 45
percent permanent partial disability award.
The Second Injury Fund was held responsible for the remaining 39 percent permanent partial disability award, or $20,807.86,
to be paid to Webb "for the aggravation of
a pre-existing condition by the industrial
injury" of April 1982.

The Second Injury Fund did not contest
the finding that it was liable for the preexisting back injury that was aggravated by
the industrial accident. However, insofar
as the award required payment for the
other preexisting impairments, the Second
Injury Fund did challenge it before the full
Commission on the following grounds: (1)
that the preexisting impairments were not
aggravated by the accident and, therefore,
were not compensable under the statute;
and (2) that before nonaggravated preexisting conditions can be compensable, the statute requires that the industrial injury must
cause at least a 10 percent impairment,
while here the impairment caused by the
industrial injury was only 6 percent. The
Commission, one member dissenting, rejected the Fund's challenge and affirmed
the administrative law judge's order. It
held that, under the statute, recovery for
all preexisting conditions was permitted
when any one of them was aggravated by
the industrial accident. The Second Injury
Fund then filed a petition for review with
this Court, raising the same arguments rejected by the Commission.
The facts are not disputed, nor are the
findings of impairment challenged. This
case presents only a question of law: under
the 1981 amendments to section 35-1-69,
what is the Second Injury Fund's responsibility for preexisting impairments not aggravated by the subsequent industrial injury? Answering this question requires
some descriptive background of the 1981
amendments.
The Second Injury Fund, previously
named the Special Fund, see 1979 Utah
Laws, ch. 138, § 3, has long been a part of
the Utah worker's compensation scheme.
In 1919, the legislature provided that if a
worker having a preexisting permanent
partial disability was injured and incurred a
permanent partial disability that was greater than he would have incurred but for its
combination with the preexisting partial
disability, then the worker was to receive
full compensation for all his disabilities.
However, he was to receive from his
present employer only compensation for
the current injury; compensation for the
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preexisting disability was to be paid by a
fund established by the legislature. 1919
Utah Laws, ch. 63, § 3140.6. We have long
acknowledged the remedial purpose of this
law:
The Legislature undoubtedly intended
. . . to provide protection for men who
had already been partially permanently
disabled, but yet were able to do work.
Without some provision of this kind, employers would be extremely hesitant in
employing men partially disabled, since
an injury resulting in partial permanent
disability of the employee might well impose greater liability on the employer
than a similar injury incurred by a person not previously disabled.
Marker v. Industrial Commission, 84
Utah 587, 592, 37 P.2d 785, 787 (1934); see
McPhie v. United States Steel Corp., Utah,
551 P.2d 504, 505 (1976);
Intermountain
Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, Utah, 610
P.2d 334, 337 (1980); Northwest Carriers,
Inc. v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 639
P.2d 138, 141 (1981); Jacobsen Construction v. Hair, Utah, 667 P.2d 25, 26 (1983).
The provision added in 1919 is now in
section 35-1-69 of the Code. Insofar as
pertinent here, it remained substantially
unchanged from 1919 until 1963. At that
time, the statute was amended to clarify
that the preexisting permanent partial disability did not have to be the result of an
industrial accident; it could be the result of
"accidental injury, disease, or congenital
causes." 1963 Utah Laws, ch. 49, § 1.
The important thing was that some disability predated the industrial accident. The
1963 amendment also changed the statute
to require that the permanent incapacity
resulting from the combined impairments
be "substantially greater" than would have
been the case if there had been no preexisting incapacity. Id. The prior law had required only that the incapacity from the
combined injuries be "greater" than otherwise.
During the years immediately before the
1981 amendments, this law was interpreted
in several significant cases. On the quantitative question of what degree of increased
incapacity was required by the words "substantially greater," the Court held that it

was enough if the contribution of the
preexisting impairment to the total combined impairment was "definite and measurable." Intermountain
Health Care,
Inc. v. Ortega, Utah, 562 P.2d 617, 619
(1977). A qualitative question was also
raised as to whether the words "substantially greater" required that any particular
relationship exist between the industrial injury and the preexisting impairment The
Second Injury Fund contended that there
should be no compensation for preexisting
impairments unless there was some causal
or functional relationship between the
preexisting impairment and the industrial
injury. The Court rejected this contention.
It was enough if the two impairments cumulatively resulted in a greater degree of
disability. Intermountain Smelting Corp.
v. Capitano, 610 P.2d at 337; see Kincheloe
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Utah, 656 P.2d
440, 442 (1982) (discussing Capitano holding). Finally, the Court made it plain that
section 35-1-69's language covering preexisting impairments caused by "injury, disease, or congenital causes" was broad
enough to reach psychiatric impairments, as
well as those occasioned by old age, mental
inability and lack of training. See Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562
P.2d at 620; Northwest Carriers, Inc. v.
Industrial Commission, 639 P.2d at 14142.
The Industrial Commission apparently
did not agree with the Ortega decision, and
perhaps others of this group, and declined
to follow them in several cases, either refusing to award compensation for preexisting impairments or refusing to order payment by the Second Injury Fund, thus requiring the employer to pay the full compensation award. See White v. Industrial
Commission, Utah, 604 P.2d 478, 480
(1979); Capitano, 610 P.2d at 337; Utah
Legislative Survey-1981, 1982 Utah L.Rev.
212, 213-14 & nn. 652-54. This Court suggested that the Commission address its
concerns to the legislature, which has the
power to change the statute, rather than
taking the matter into its own hands by
refusing to follow this Court's decisions.
Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d at 337. The 1981 amend-
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ments to section 35-1-69 are the apparent result of legislative consideration of
these various issues, or so we were informed at oral argument by counsel for the
Second Injury Fund.
The differences between the language
added by the 1981 amendment and the prior statute are as follows:
35-1-69. COMBINED INJURIES RESULTING IN PERMANENT INCAPACITY—PAYMENTOT^
JURY FUND—TRAINING OF EMPLOYEE. (1) If any employee who has
previously incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury for which either compensation aa4
or medical care, or both, is provided by
this title that results in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than
he would have incurred if he had not had
the pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is aggravated by such preexisting incapacity, compensation, &»d
medical care, which medical care and other related items ate as outlined in section
35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of
the combined injuries, but the liability of
the employer for such compensation, a»d
medical care, and other related items
shall be for the industrial injury only and
the remainder shall be paid out of the
special second injury fund provided for in
section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter referred to
as the "special fund."

The amendment described the relationship that must necessarily exist between
the preexisting impairment and the industrial injury impairment in order for both
impairments to be compensated. In effect,
it gave definition to the concepts underlying the term "substantially greater." It
has displaced the "definite and measurable" contribution to impairment definition
of "substantially greater" articulated by
this Court in Ortega (although it would not
change the result there) and substituted
two more concrete tests that deal differently with situations where an industrial injury aggravates or is aggravated by a preexisting impairment, on the one hand, and
those where the industrial injury bears no
such relationship to a preexisting impairment, on the other.1 See Utah Legislative
Survey-1981, 1982 Utah L.Rev. 212, 214.

For purposes of this section, (a) any
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease, or congenital cause shall be deemed
"substantially greater", and compensation, medical care, and other related
items shall be awarded on the basis of
the combined injuries as provided above;
provided, however, that (b) where there
is no such aggravation, no award for
combined injuries shall be made unless
the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial
injury is 10% or greater and the percentage of permanent physical impairment

[1] The first of these new tests we
must consider is the "aggravation" test
added to both quoted paragraphs of section
35-1-69(1). The language added by the
1981 amendments is not without redundancies and ambiguities. Specifically, the "aggravation" language added to the first
paragraph of section 35-1-69(1) reads as an
alternative to the "substantially greater"
language that precedes it. The language
added to the second paragraph, however,
suggests that "aggravation" is simply one
of two alternative tests that may be met to

1. Although the test of "substantially greater" set
out in Ortega has been displaced, the amendments left intact the Court's rulings in Capitano,
on the lack of need for a causal or functional

resulting from all causes and conditions^
including: the industrial injury, is greater
than 20%. Where the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection (l)(b) of
this section previously has been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial disability under this act or
the Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Law, such compensation shall be deducted from the liability assessed to the second injury fund under this paragraph.
(Underlined material added and lined-out
material deleted by 1981 amendment.)

relationship between impairments, and in Ortega and Northwest Carriers, on types of compensable preexisting impairments.
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satisfy an overarching "substantially
greater" requirement. After consideration, we conclude that these alternative
constructions are more apparent than real.
Regardless of how the statute is read, the
overall thrust of the amended law seems
clear with respect to aggravation: if the
industrial injury results in a permanent impairment that is aggravated by or aggravates a preexisting permanent impairment
to any degree, then compensation shall be
awarded and allocated between the employer and the Second Injury Fund based upon
the combined impairments.
[2] The Second Injury Fund contends
that the Commission erred when, in the
present case, it found that aggravation of
any one preexisting impairment required
compensation for all preexisting impairments, regardless of their relationship to
the industrial injury and regardless of their
severity. We agree with the Fund. Here
the preexisting back impairment was aggravated by the industrial injury. Without
more, the aggravation test is met, and compensation should be awarded for these two
combined impairments. The Commission
has awarded compensation for them, and
the Second Injury Fund does not dispute
coverage. However, the Commission went
on to order compensation for all preexisting impairments. This was error. The language of subsection (a) of the second paragraph of section 35-1-69(1) speaks of aggravation of "a pre-existing injury," not all
such injuries. In addition, the word "aggravate" would seem to require that some
relationship exist between the industrial injury and the preexisting impairment that is
subject to compensation. There is no such
relationship between the second back injury and either the eye or hand impairments.
We reject the aggravation test articulated
by the Commission and hold that aggravation of the old back injury cannot trigger
compensation for unrelated preexisting impairments.
This does not end the matter, however.
The amendments to section 35-1-69(1) establish a second and entirely independent
test for compensation where there is no

aggravation. Under the first paragraph,
preexisting impairments are to be compensated for when the industrial injury produces an impairment substantially greater
than it would have been absent the preexisting conditions; the second paragraph
elaborates on this general standard by stating that no combination of impairments
shall be deemed to be "substantially greater" than the industrial injury impairment
alone unless the industrial injury impairment is 10 percent or more, and the total
impairment from all combined causes is 20
percent or more. In the present case, the
total impairment of claimant Webb is far
more than 20 percent. The only question is
whether the 10 percent minimum is satisfied.
[3] The Second Injury Fund contends
that the Commission properly fixed the industrial injury impairment at 6 percent on
a partial-man basis, rather than at 10 percent on a ^hole-man basis, because under
Jacobsen Construction v. Hair, Utah, 667
P.2d 25 (1983), combined partial-man impairment ratings must be used to allocate
responsibility between the Second Injury
Fund and the employer. We disagree.
The amendments to section 35-1-69 set the
10 and 20 percent thresholds in order to
assure that both the industrial injury and
total impairments reach certain fixed levels
of seriousness before any nonaggravating
preexisting impairments are compensated.
However, there is no indication that the
Legislature intended to fix these degree-ofseriousness minimums by reference to the
standards articulated by this Court in Hair
for an entirely different purpose. Therefore, we find no justification for importing
partial-man ratings into the 1981 amendments and hold that the 10 and 20 percent
threshold figures are whole-man impairment ratings.
If there were any question on this issue,
an examination of the -consequences of the
Second Injury Fund's position would dispel
it. To adopt partial-man ratings in order to
assess compliance with the minimum
thresholds would unfairly deny compensation to those who are the most handi-
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capped, while granting it to the less severely handicapped. For example, if two individuals, one with a 20 percent preexisting
impairment and another with a 60 percent
preexisting impairment, were injured on
the job and suffered identical serious but
nonaggravating injuries rated as 20 percent whole-man impairments, the individual
with the lesser preexisting handicap would
recover for his preexisting impairment,
while the one more seriously handicapped
would not, although he presumably could
least afford the additional loss of body
function. The reason for this is that under
the Hair formula, the first individual
would be an 80 percent man for evaluation
purposes (100% - 20% = 80%), and his industrial injury would still exceed the 10
percent minimum (80% x 20% = 16%);
however, the second would only be a 40
percent man (100% - 60% = 40%), and his
identical injury would not reach the 10 percent minimum (40% x 20% = 8%). Absent
explicit language, we cannot presume that
the legislature intended such an inequitable
result.
[4] The Commission should have found
that claimant Webb, who had a 10 percent
whole-man impairment from the industrial
injury, satisfied the nonaggravation test of
section 35-1-69 and that he was properly
entitled to compensation for all preexisting
impairments. The Commission did order
this compensation, albeit on improper
grounds.
[5] One further point needs to be made.
The Second Injury Fund contends throughout its briefs that even if the nonaggravation statutory minimums are met, some
further showing is necessary before compensation for preexisting impairments may
be permitted. It argues that the percentage tests set out in subsection (b) of the
second paragraph are separate from the
"substantially greater" test in the first
paragraph and that industrial injury impairment still must be found to have met
the separate "substantially greater" test.
To satisfy this test, the Fund claims that
some causal or functional relationship must
exist between the preexisting impairment

and the current one. To support this proposition, the Fund relies on inferences
drawn from our per curiam opinion in
Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, Utah, 669 P.2d
440, 442 (1983), but ignores our statements
rejecting this construction in Capitano and
Kincheloe. See p. 1179, supra. The language of Day's Market does not support
the Fund's position. In a nonaggravation
case, no functional relationship between
the current injury and the preexisting impairment is necessary to award compensation. The only issue under the amended
statute in a nonaggravation case is whether the minimum percentages have been satisfied. Once satisfied, as in this case, the
"substantially greater" test is met.
The Chief Justice's dissent states that
the statute's "substantially greater" requirement is not satisfied by meeting one
of the two alternative tests added by the
1981 amendments in the second paragraph
of section 35-1-69(1). He would require, in
addition, a finding of some causal or functional relationship between the industrial
injury and the preexisting condition before
compensation for the preexisting impairment can be ordered.
This position is founded upon Day's Market and the recent re-reading given our
precedents in the Chief Justice's dissent in
Chavez v. Industrial Commission, Utah,
709 P.2d 1168 (1985). However, in the
present case the dissent has made no attempt to describe how the additional requirement of such a causal or functional
relationship* can be reconciled with the explicit language of the 1981 amendments. I
suggest that any attempt to do so would
fail for the simple reason that the legislature, like the Industrial Commission, has
read our earlier cases as reducing the "substantially greater" requirement to nothing
more than an additive test, requiring that
all impairments be accumulated, without
regard to whether they have any causal or
functional relationship to, the industrial injury. Only by viewing our cases and the
statute in this way can we sensibly construe the 1981 amendments.
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A document that has recently come to
our attention, A Sunset Audit of the Utah
State Industrial Commission, Report No.
84-12 of the Office of the Legislative Auditor General to the Utah State Legislature
(Oct.1984) (hereinafter "Sunset Audit"),
provides confirmation that the Commission
views our cases as set forth in this opinion.
Pursuant to the Utah sunset review legislation, the Legislative Auditor General considered the Industrial Commission and the
legislation it administers, including the second injury fund law. The Industrial Commission has endorsed the resulting Sunset
Audit. In its summary description of the
present state of second injury fund law, the
Audit states:
The second injury fund statute specifies
additional benefits that are inequitable.
The Utah system has evolved to provide
benefits for the personal loss felt by
injured workers in addition to the compensation for lost wages originally intended. As a result, the state Supreme
Court now interprets the second injury
fund statute to compensate the personal loss felt for any handicap that precedes the industrial accident. We feel
that these additional benefits are inequitable and do nothing to promote the
fund's stated purpose of removing disincentives to hire the handicapped.
Sunset Audit at ii. (Emphasis added.)
The report itself describes some of the
handicaps referred to in the summary as
"such preexisting conditions as thirty-yearold deer hunting accidents, old football injuries, and psychological disorders; some
. have even attempted compensation for obesity and alcoholism
" Sunset Audit at
18. Although the Commission, like the
Legislative Auditor General, apparently
finds the results required by the statute as
we have construed it to be unpalatable, it
2. The Commission's agreement with the report
and conclusions of the Sunset Audit is evidenced by a letter appended to it, dated October
12, 1984, and signed by all three commissioners.
It states:
We have reviewed the audit and are in
agreement with the findings and recommen-

has been following them, if the award in
this case is any example.2
The dissent of the Chief Justice in Chavez reads into our earlier cases limitations
on recovery which, I submit, can be found
there only by creative hindsight. The reason for this attempt to limit recovery under
our earlier cases is understandable. It has
become apparent that the Commission, in
implementing those decisions, has felt compelled to award compensation to those,
such as Mr. Webb in the present case, who
suffer from preexisting impairments entirely unrelated to their industrial injuries. An
industrial injury can thus trigger compensation to an employee for a whole laundry
list of infirmities that in no way worsened
the industrially caused impairment
Apparently the Legislative Auditor General and the Commission also agree that
this policy is improvident. The Commission's actions, however, are plainly the result of a fair reading of both our prior
decisions and the statute's vague language.
The legislature, presumably relying upon
the statutory interpretation reflected in our
cases, already acted in 1981 by passing
amendments aimed at limiting awards from
the Second Injury Fund.
All this may be coming to a head with
the Sunset Audit's recommendation, endorsed by the Commission, that the statute
be even more sharply limited, if not; repealed. The Audit asserts that the Fund,
even with the 1981 amendments, no longer
serves the purpose for which it was designed and that awards under the second
injury fund statute are no longer consonant
with the basic policy of the worker's compensation statutes which it was designed to
complement.
Under those circumstances, matters have
gone too far for this Court to attempt to
remedy by judicial fiat problems created by
what some see as an outdated statutory
policy and by our earlier decisions attemptdations
As you know, we have been
working toward the accomplishment of the
recommendations pertaining to the . . . Second Injury Fund for some time but have been
hampered by the factors stated in the audit
report.
Sunset Audit app. (1984).
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ing to implement the policy and to construe
the statute's unclear language. The legislature has studied and acted upon the matter. It may act again in the future. We
must respect its actions and leave with it
the responsibility for further statutory
changes. The legislature is certainly better suited than we to weigh policy considerations and to articulate new standards for
the Commission to follow, especially when
the statute with which we are faced is not
a model of clarity. The best we can do is
explain what we think the legislature has
achieved through the amendments and then
leave the matter in its hands for further
action.

determination that aggravation of any one
preexisting incapacity requires compensation for all preexisting incapacities. However, for the basic reasons set forth in my
dissent in Chavez v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 709 P.2d 1168 (1985), I do not
join the majority in its holding that no
functional relationship is necessary between the industrial incapacity and the
preexisting incapacity in order to support
an award of compensation.
The "substantially greater" requirement
of section 35-1-69(1) remains intact following the 1981 amendments. Consequently, I
would reverse the contrary order of the
Commission.

We affirm the order of the Commission
for the reasons set forth in this opinion.
STEWART, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ.,
concur.
HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting):
I concur in the conclusion reached by the
majority that the Commission erred in its
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